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Even in 1776 describing the built of nations` wealth, Adam Smith said that “it 
seldom happens… that a great proprietor is a great improver…” This statement is 
more than relevant nowadays. Only today we are talking not about landlords but 
about shareholders employing menagers to act in their best interest.  
But often individual subgoals might conflict with achieving the organization’s 
goals. This situation in corporate governance is called Agency Problem, also 
known as Principal-agent problem or agency dilemma.  
In the light of recent corporate scandals (Enron, Deutsche Bank AG, 
Volkswagen, WorldCom) the importance of implementing strong and effective 
corporate governance is a hot topic. Expecally it concerns Ukraine, where 
traditions of corporate governance are comperetevly young and were forming 
under special circumstances. 
This article is devoted to the analysis of international experience in solving 
agency problems, in particular the ones involving the conflict between the firm’s 
owners and its hired managers,  and possibilities of applying these strategies in 
Ukrainian reality. 
Actually almost any contractual relationship, in which one party (the ‘agent’) 
promises performance to another (the ‘principal’), is potentially subject to an 
agency problem. Managers think that since they have some power and authority in 
the business firm, they can use it for their own benefit, and maximize their own 
self-interests rather than the wealth of the shareholders. The evasion of orders, 
malingering and intentional lack of dependability fall within the definition of 
sabotage as the "willful withdrawal of efficiency from the production process." 
As stated by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, the basic agency problems are 
results of “an informational advantage” of agent. Moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems are caused by asymmetric information. Agent is in the better 
position as the one who knows what actions were taken and the true evaluation of 
their effect. As a consequence, the agent has an incentive to act opportunistically, 
skimping on the quality of his performance, or even diverting to himself some of 
what was promised to the principal.  
Paul Lautenschlager distinguishes three types of information asymmetry: the 
uncertainty in the qualitative characteristics of the agent, moral hazard and the 
possible malversation of the agent. 
Another reason for principal-agent problem is an incomplete contracting. The 
advantage of an incomplete contract is that it provides the management of the firm 
with a “general clause” allowing them to adjust the terms as the situation changes. 
So if agents are really to perform consistently in the manner they are supposed 
to, they will need to be suitably motivated by some combination of material 
incentives, moral incentives, and/or coercive incentives that will make it seem 
worth their while to attend faithfully to their service obligations and fiduciary 
duties.  
John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman name two big sets of 
mitigating the agency problems strategies: regulatory and governance.  
Regulatory strategies include another two blocks: the agent constrains and the 
affiliation terms. By the agent constrain they mean rules and standards. The 
affiliation terms involve regulating terms on which principal affiliate with agent, 
meaning terms of entry and exit. The entry strategy is particulary important in 
screening out opportunistic agents, requiring, for example, them to disclose 
information about the likely quality of their performance before contracting with 
principals. The exit strategy allows principals to escape opportunistic agents. Even 
the thread of withdrawing or using the transfer of control rights can be a highly 
affective device for disciplining management. 
Paul M. Johnson to techniques used to overcome or alleviate the agency 
problem includes the elections whereby the recent performance of the agent may 
be periodically scrutinized by his or her principals and competing candidates for 
the job may be allowed to make their case for replacing the incumbent agent by 
revealing his or her shortcomings and showing how performance might be 
improved through a change in command. 
The governance strategies consist of appointment rights, decision rights and 
agent incentives. Appointment rights give principal the power to select or remove 
directors. Decision rights expand the power of principals to initiate or ratify 
management decisions. But only the largest and most fundmental corporate 
decisions require the ratification of shareholders.  
The incentive strategies include reward and trusteeship strategies. 
There are two principal reward mechanisms in corporate law. The first one is 
the sharing rule that motivates loyalty by tying the agent`s monetary returns 
directly to those of principal.  Managers are frequently given the option to buy 
stock at a bargain price. The more the stock is worth; the more valuable is this 
option. In fact, options are often used to motivate employees of all types, not just 
top management.     
Boris Nikolov and Tony M. Whited outline that the equity share aligns the 
manager’s interests with those of shareholders, but the bonus can move him away 
from the objective of maximizing stockholder value by causing him to put 
excessive weight on the objective of maximizing current profits or increasing stock 
prices, not always using legal methods.  
Another reward mechanism is the pay-for-performance rigime in which an 
agent is paid for successfully advancing principal’s interest, meaning that CEO's 
salary should be based on the company's profits.But there can be a problem of 
measuring the agent’s performance. In the case of large organizations, metering is 
complicated by the fact that most production is what Alchian and Demsetz call 
"team production," so that no individual's marginal productivity is clearly 
identifiable, and it is difficult to determine the individual's share of the joint output. 
Year-end bonuses are also a common form of this sort of pay system. Khalid 
Abdalla propose to align the incentives of employee with the employers the use of 
“seniority wages” – when workers are initially hired at a rate lower than their 
marginal productivity but see their wages rise as they demonstrate their value to 
the company. On the contrary, in Shapiro-Stiglitz model emloyers pay workers an 
above-market wage called an efficiency wage so as to prevent workers from 
slacking off 
The trusteeship strategy assumes that in absence of strongly focused monetary 
incentives to behaive opportunistically agents will respond to the low-powered 
incentives of conscience, pride and reputation. The example of such strategy is the 
concept of “the independent director”.   
Kenneth Arrow on the contrary is sure that monitoring helps to mitigate the 
principal-agent problem. There is a need to pay attention to operating expenses, 
watching out for the President’s hotel suit for a business trip or frequent 
unexplained use of corporate jet. And most of all monitoring concerns accounting 
documents, as they often appear to be the object of disinformation. Therefore, 
corporate governance requires constant attention from shareholders, business 
consulting firms, and government regulators.   
In Ukraine resolving agency problems has some peculiarities. The corporate 
sector, which was created by privatization, is characterized by prompt, large scale 
growth and resulted in considerable advance changes to a legal base and corporate 
governance culture. And joint-stock companies in Ukraine which were not created 
by voluntary association of private capital but by directive methods of "fair" 
property distribution are “man-made” formations. Under the circumstance of 
fragmentation of national share capital, caused by uncompensated distribution of 
shares, minority shareholders cannot affect the behavior of managers in the public 
corporation. 
The result is a complete concentration of power in the hands of management 
and identification in one person the owner and manager. Equity is mostly dispersed 
between senior management, middle management and lower power and 
employees. So the chance of forming effective corporate governance has been lost 
from the start. 
Stock options are a good way to match managerial and shareholder goals. But 
it can be used only in public companies, which stocks are listed on the stock 
market. The practice shows that their quantity in Ukraine is not big. Nevertheless a 
lot of them are claiming to try for IPO. 
Another popular way of reducing the risk of agency problems is Internal and 
External Auditing System. But it is also highly problematic for Ukrainian 
companies as they are still afraid to reveil the information and are just lerning the 
data disclosure. Not to mention the high level of shadow economy. 
There is also a problem with CEO's salary based on the company's profits. 
And many Ukrainian companies are loss making. 
So as we see agency problems in corporate economy are the result of absentee 
ownership, and probably nowadays, the best strategy for Ukrainian corporations is 
a combination of efficiency wages and creation of coercive conditions. 
 
